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bstract
his contribution is about the ‘progressive research program’, as Imre Lakatos would have called it, initiated by New Institutional Economics.
fter a short reminder of the ‘golden triangle’ of concepts and tools introduced by the founders (Coase, North, Ostrom, Williamson) and their
ollowers, the paper turns to a quick overview of the attainments of this paradigm along its dominant branches: organization theory and institutional
nalysis. The emphasis is on the new paths opening up, with a focus on two key issues: hybrid arrangements, which may well be the prevailing
rganization of transactions in developed market economies; and intermediate, ‘meso-institutions’, which likely provide the missing link between
he general rules framing socioeconomic activities and the actors operating within these rules. The underlying argument is that whatever happens
o the label ‘NIE’, this research program will remain with us for a long time ahead.
 2018 The Author. Published by Elsevier Editora Ltda. on behalf of Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e
ontabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
reativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
eywords: New institutional economomics; Organization theory; Institutional analysis
esumo
ste artigo trata do “programa de pesquisa” – conforme Imre Lakatos o chamaria – iniciado pela Nova Economia Institucional (NEI). Após um
reve resumo do “triângulo de ouro” de ferramentas teóricas e conceitos introduzidos pelos fundadores da NEI e seus seguidores, o trabalho
presenta uma visão geral das conquistas do paradigma em suas correntes dominantes: teoria da organizac¸ão e análise institucional. Ênfase é dada a
ovas avenidas de pesquisa, com foco em dois temas-chave: arranjos híbridos, que possivelmente constituem a principal maneira de organizac¸ão de
ransac¸ões em economias de mercado desenvolvidas; e “meso-instituic¸ões” intermediárias, que provavelmente fornecem a ligac¸ão não identificada
ntre as regras gerais que influenciam atividades socioeconômicas e os atores que operam com base em tais regras. O argumento central é o seguinte:
ndependentemente do que ocorrer com a etiqueta “NEI”, este programa de pesquisa permanecerá entre nós por um longo período adiante.
 2018 O Autor. Publicado por Elsevier Editora Ltda. em nome de Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e
ontabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP. Este e´ um artigo Open Access sob uma licenc¸a CC BY-NC-ND (http://
reativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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ntroduction
The task assigned to this lecture is a hard one. Drawing
 broad picture of research at the frontiers of New Institu-
ional Economics (NIE) in the context of ‘post-crisis reflections’,
hich is the theme of this year forum, is very demanding at a
ime when the founding thinkers of NIE are gone or not much
ctive anymore, with part of the agenda they initiated already
ulfilled and/or integrated in mainstream economics. In what
ollows I shall focus on selected issues on which NIE already
ade significant contributions and, even more importantly, on
uestions raised by contributors to NIE that still remain to be
nswered, whatever the label under which this will be done.
In doing so, I intend to deliver two central messages. First,
 shall argue that understanding the conditions of implementa-
ion and enforcement  of rules and norms and the institutional
evices through which this is done is central for explicating
ow economies actually work. Second, I shall emphasize that
umerous concepts developed over the decades following the
athbreaking contributions of Ronald Coase provide tools  to go
urther on these issues.
The next sections substantiate these messages along the fol-
owing lines. The first section, on ‘New  institutional  economics:
oundations’, briefly summarizes the conceptual hard core of
IE that will likely remain part of any future development in
nstitutional analysis. The second section, on ‘New  frontiers  in
he economics  of  organization’, provides an overview of some
ecent contributions in the branch of NIE focusing on the eco-
omics of organization to point out possible micro-foundations
o economic disequilibria. The third section, on ‘New  frontiers
n institutional  analysis’, turns to the institutional dimensions,
f which organizations are an important component, to show
ources of misalignment that can derail an economy from its
xpected trajectory. The last section, on ‘What  future  for  NIE?’,
raws lessons and perspectives with the underlying assumption
hat the conceptual apparatus developed within NIE is likely to
ollinate the agenda of researchers and policy-makers for quite a
hile since so many issues pointed out by this research program
emain to be explored.
ew  institutional  economics:  foundations
The leading figures at the origin of the development of the
IE research program (Ronald Coase, Douglass North, Elinor
strom, Oliver Williamson) are now well-known since they all
eceived, at different times, the Nobel Prize in economics.
In a recent paper, Mary Shirley and I pointed out the com-
lex set of influences that shaped their thought and some of the
ontributors that developed and diffused their initial intuitions
Ménard & Shirley, 2014; see also Furubotn & Richter, 1997).
hat is striking is the variety of contributions of those leading
gures and the numerous fields they pollinated, from organi-
ation theory to public choices, law and economics, political
cience, economic history and so on.1
1 For an overview of this diversity see Ménard and Shirley (eds.) (2008).
d
(Fig. 1. Conceptual framework: the ‘golden triangle’.
eading  concepts
However, I would like to use the limited time I have to
ocus on the set of concepts that progressively emerged from
his network of contributors, a network that eventually ended
n the creation of the International Society for New Institu-
ional Economics (since 2015, the Society for Institutional and
rganizational Economics).
This conceptual apparatus can be tagged as the ‘golden tri-
ngle’ of NIE (Fig. 1). The components of this triangle and
heir interactions provide powerful tools to investigate the insti-
utional dimensions framing economies. The ﬁrst  corner  of the
riangle is about rights, more precisely about two types of rights,
roperty rights and decision rights. These rights rarely fully coin-
ide, which is an important source of potential mismatch and
aws that may derail economic activities. The second  corner  is
bout transactions and transaction cost. Recent developments in
IE suggest a distinction between economic transaction costs
nd political transaction cost2: both can be important sources
f distortions in decision-making. The third  corner  is about
ontracts, which are most of the time incomplete, thus opening
oom for potential maladjustments. This emphasis on contracts
as been criticized. True, they do not explain everything, by
ar. However, they provide a good point of entry to the analy-
is of the role played by rights and transactions; and they also
rovide a powerful point of entry to the analysis of organizations
firms, markets, and interfirm agreements) and their institutional
mbeddedness.
tructuration  of the  domain
These concepts have structured two main branches in the New
nstitutional Economics program: one focusing on the micro-
nalytical level at which transactions are actually organized (the
rganizational level, very much identified to the williamsonian
liation); the other focusing on the macro-level of the political,omain associated to the name of Douglass North and, to a
2 Although the idea of political transaction cost can be traced back to Stigler
1971).
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tional arrangements. The upper curve delineates the “possibility
frontier”, above which the organization of transactions would
be unsustainable with respect to the characteristics of these
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(‘spot’)C. Ménard / RAUSP Mana
esser degree, Elinor Ostrom). Let me turn to a short explo-
ation of these two domains, pointing out aspects that might be
articularly relevant for the topic of this Forum.
ew  frontiers  in  the  economics  of  organization
Let me first pay attention to what can be identified as
ew frontiers  in  the  economics  of  organization, which is the
icro-institutional level, the level at which are made decisions
egarding the actual organization of economic activities and their
ssociated transactions.
nderstanding  the  variety  of  organizational  arrangements
A major contribution of NIE in that respect has been to exhibit
he existence of many different ways to organize transactions,
rrangements that compose and structure a market economy
and, in that respect, any economic system); and to provide tools
or the analysis of this variety. This is not as trivial a statement
s it could seem. Even today, most leading economic textbooks
haracterize economies through a dyad: markets and firms, with
onsumers in the background. Identifying alternative organiza-
ional arrangements has been a long process, and it is still going
n. Acknowledging this diversity has a very important conse-
uence for theoretical developments but also for policy makers:
ost of the time there is no  one  single  optimal  solution  for  orga-
izing transactions. We live in a world of second, even third
est, in which there is no “ONE-SIZE-FITS-ALL” solution. A
hort reminder might be useful here to clarify this continuing
eference to transactions: ‘economic transactions’ are about the
ransfer across technologically separable activities of rights to
se resources.
The initial conceptualization of this variety of organizational
rrangements was provided by Williamson (1985,1996).3 Build-
ng on the intuition of Coase (1937, 1960), Williamson made
he concept of transaction operational by identifying three lead-
ng characteristics (or ‘attributes’) of transactions: the frequency
F) with which a transaction is repeated, the uncertainty (U) sur-
ounding its organization, and the specificity of investments (AS)
he transaction may require. But the main point that Williamson
ade is that we face a major problem here: if you have to choose
 modality to organize a transaction (say, securing the supply of a
trategic input), you face the problem of finding the right align-
ent between this organizational choice and the attributes of
he transaction at stake. Hence, there is the possibility of a mis-
lignment  that can generate discrepancies, even a ‘crisis’, at the
icroeconomic level. Let me briefly mention two examples: (1)
 classical reference is about the potential mismatch between
oal suppliers and producers of electricity, which could produce
isruption in the energy sector (Joskow, 1985,1991); (2) a much
ore recent and spectacular example is about the organizationalisturbances following the emergence of the new technologies
f information and communication, as vividly illustrated by the
o-called ‘uberization’ of our economies.
3 A pioneering contribution is from Rubin (1978), about franchising.t Journal 53 (2018) 3–10 5
Since the task I have been assigned is to look at ‘new fron-
iers’, let me point out what I consider the major development of
he last decade when it comes to the economics of organization.
t might be summarized by looking at the interaction between
he attributes of transactions, mainly Uncertainty (U) and Speci-
city of Investments (AS) and the allocation of rights. In sum, we
re looking simultaneously at two corners of the ‘golden trian-
le’, with a special attention to the distinction between property
ights and decision rights.
Property  rights  (PR) are hereafter identified as the capacity
f the holder of these rights to control the transfer of rights
eeded to organize transactions and to be residual claimant on
he outcome. In other terms, the residual claimant determines
HO in last resort control what to do with the available resources
nd the conditions under which rights over these resources can be
ransferred. An example is the decision to develop a joint venture
etween two otherwise independent and even competing firms.
By contrast, decision  rights  are about HOW  rights to use
re going to be actually exercised, and/or about the procedures
hrough which decision-makers can operate. The central exam-
le (and a key issue in developed economies) is of course the
ights allocated to managers to reorganize tasks within the rules
efined by holders of property rights (or some of them!). A great
irtue of NIE in that respect is to have introduced the key role
f managers in our theoretical economic landscape.
apturing  the  variety  of  organizational  arrangements:  a
ramework
We can now put these ingredients together and provide a gen-
ral framework to capture the resulting variety of organizational
rrangements (Fig. 2).
The horizontal axis indicates the intensity at which prop-
rty rights  are put together (centralized), which depends on the
trategic intensity of investments (from low to high). The vertical
xis captures the intensity of decentralization (or ‘delegation’)
f decision  rights, again from low to high. Combining these
wo dimensions delineates the domain of possible organiza-Strategic investments/
property rights pooled
Low
Low
HIERARCHIES
High
Fig. 2. The variety of arrangements conceptualized.
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ransactions (e.g., the uncertainty surrounding their organiza-
ion is just too high). The lower curve delineates the domain
nder which transactions tend to become hardly tractable or
ave attributes that push toward the adoption of pure forms
pure ‘spot’ markets, pure ‘hierarchies’), which tend to be rather
xceptional, contrarily to the prediction of standard theory.
Most transactions are actually organized within the lens delin-
ated by these two curves. This lens (the ‘acceptance zone’) is
he domain of relational contracts (the third corner of our ‘golden
riangle’), that is: the domain within which contracts are incom-
lete, providing only a framework, a blueprint within which
arties to the transactions adjust mutually (through the role of
anagers; or through arbitration; or through court decisions,
tc.). This is also the domain within which hybrid  arrangements
end to prevail. Hybrids, to be short, are modalities of organizing
ransactions that rely neither on pure market relationships, with
he price mechanism at the center of coordination, nor on full
ntegration within a firm, with hierarchy as the ultimate mean
f coordination). Hybrids can be more rigorously defined as the
rganization of transactions among legally autonomous entities
hat keep strategic property rights separated but share significant
ecision rights because it is the best way to create added value:
nly joint usage of the relevant assets can deliver a surplus.
aving acknowledged the existence and importance of hybrids
n the organization of economic activities is in my view a major
reakthrough in modern economics of organization.
llustration:  cooperatives
Cooperatives are illustrative of this type of organizational
rrangements, with cooperators keeping full control over their
pecific assets while possibly sharing some of them (joint owner-
hip) and above all sharing decision rights to a degree that in
any cases is highly significant. Cooperatives play a very impor-
ant role as a modality to organize transactions in developed
arket economies, which is somehow puzzling for standard
conomic theory. In some countries (e.g. Finland) it is even the
ominant form that entirely structures the economy. At the sector
evel it may also play an important role. A fascinating case in that
espect is the spectacular increase in the number of cooperatives
n the German-energy sector over the last 10 years (Fig. 3).
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Fig. 3. The example of energy-cooperatives in Germany.
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This case is fascinating in that this development connects
o two crucial components of the NIE framework. Indeed, it is
he result of: (1) changes in the nature and specificity of invest-
ents, coming out of technological changes, as is often the case:
he emergence of new technologies, from solar panels to smart
rids, allowing more decentralized organizations with less spe-
ific investments to deliver energy; (2) changes in institutional
ules of the game, in this case changes in the German fiscal
egime to facilitate ‘renewable energies’.
There are many other examples of HYBRIDS (Ménard, 2013,
hap. 26; Ménard, 2014, 2018): (1) franchising, which now
epresents a ‘heavy weight’ in distribution (but not only!); (2)
trategic alliances that now dominate the airline industry; (3)
lural forms, characterizing firms that diversify the type of sup-
lying arrangements on which they rely, as in the automobile
ndustry – the so-called ‘Toyota’ model-, in agri-business, etc.
ome  consequences  for  economic  policies
This variety of organizational arrangements has important
onsequences for economic theory (the need to revisit the dual-
sm of ‘markets’ and ‘firms’ also identified as hierarchies); but
lso for economic policies, e.g., revisiting competition rules (ex.:
re strategic alliances falling under ‘collusion practices’?), fiscal
egimes (as in the case of cooperatives), labor laws and ‘liability’
in a franchising system what are the respective responsibilities
f the franchisor and the franchisees?).
ew  frontiers  in  institutional  analysis
These issues bring into the picture the other dimension of the
ew Institutional Economics research program: the institutional
mbeddedness of organizational arrangements into the judiciary,
he polity, the administrative setting, and even underlying norms
nd beliefs.
nstitutional  embeddedness:  guiding  principles
In that respect the conceptual apparatus summarized above
as allowed to go much further than simply stating that ‘institu-
ions matter,’ which was already a non-negligible steps forward
or most economists (do remember that the idea that institutions
atter was long ignored in economic theory or considered not
elonging to its domain). First, it is now accepted that organi-
ational arrangements, including markets, are deeply framed  by
nd embedded  in  their  institutional  environment. Indeed, the set
f concepts that define the ‘golden triangle’ through which I have
haracterized organizations all have an institutional dimension.
econd, it is increasingly acknowledged that this institutional
nvironment is not a homogenous gelatin in which all transac-
ions would be soaked, but that it is composed of intricate  layers.
nfolding these layers is an important task on the research
genda of those of us who want to better understand how rules
nd norms actually operate. Third, recent developments sug-
est that the interactions among these institutional layers (and
etween these layers and technologies) involve the existence of
critical functions’. Critical functions are those requirements (i)
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hat some transactions must meet in order for economic activ-
ties to be sustainable; and (ii) that institutions must secure in
rder to maintain socio-economic cohesion.
ome  consequences  on  our  understanding  of  economic
ystems
These achievements have important consequences if we want
o better understand gaps, flaws, even crises in the running of
conomic systems. For example, properly identifying the criti-
al functions might be decisive to adapt .  . .  or fail to adapt to
hanging circumstances such as those imposed by the ongoing
echnological revolution.
Let me illustrate very briefly with two examples. At the micro-
evel, consider the running of a railway system. In that sector,
nter-operability is central to meet passengers’ expectations . .  .
nd to avoid crashes. On the technical side, there is the need
o coordinate and properly maintain the signaling systems (for
xample, there are several signaling systems involved in the
unning of THALYS between Paris and Amsterdam); on the
nstitutional side, there is the need to implement appropriate
nstitutions to coordinate (for example, who is going to allocate
he slots between Paris and Amsterdam and according to what
riteria if competition is going to be introduced). Modalities
f defining and allocating rights and of organizing transactions
re critical for this apparently well-known and well-understood
ctivity: running a railway system!
At the macro-level, there is also the risk of a mismatch
etween the general rules of the game and the actual organi-
ation of transactions by operators. For example the rules of the
ame in the energy sector, largely built in the context of cen-
ralized systems that prevailed in most countries until now are
ess and less adapted to the complex requirements of interdepen-
ent and technologically heterogeneous sources of energy (e.g.,
he coordination of wind farms, solar energy, hydro, etc.) which
mpose a different technological architecture.
w
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Fig. 4. A general institu
(Source: Kunneke, Ménard, &t Journal 53 (2018) 3–10 7
There are two major consequences here. First, mismatches
mong institutional layers and/or between institutional rules and
echnologies (and the potential gaps in their mutual adjustment)
an be the source of major disruptions in economic activities, up
o the point of challenging societal cohesion. Second, if we refer
o the distinction between property rights and decision rights, the
ismatch between these two vectors of rights might generate
ajor political  transaction  costs.  Political transaction costs, a
oncept explicitly introduced by North (1990b) are the costs of
eaching and stabilizing a coalition among constituencies with
ifferent, diverging, even conflicting interests. Illustrative are
he difficulties faced by the adoption and implementation of the
o-called ‘public-private partnerships’.
The initial insights on these issues were largely provided by
orth (1981), North (1990a, 2004), North, Weingast, and Wallis
2009) and to a lesser degree of influence, by Ostrom (2005).
lthough proposing partially different approaches, the contrib-
tions of Aoki (2001), Greif (2006), Acemoglu and Robinson
2012) also go in this direction, in which the focus has been on a
yadic approach, looking at the interaction between what North
alled the ‘institutional environment’ (defining the ‘rules of the
ame’) and the ‘institutional arrangements’ (organizations and
ndividual actors identified as ‘the players of the game’).
 general  model  of  institutional  interactions
Building on the concepts of NIE, but also integrating other
ontributions (institutional design, system engineering), ongo-
ng researches provide a more complex representation of what
e call ‘institutions’. Fig. 4 summarizes this complex netting of
ifferent institutional layers and their interactions.
It is out of question to comment this conceptual frame-
ork extensively in the short time allocated. Let me emphasize
wo aspects. First, the representation of this framework clearly
mphasizes the role of the technological dimension and the
eed to take on board technologies in their interaction with
tions
Macro-institutions
(general rules establishing
rights and modalities of
their allocation)
Micro-institutions
(organizational
arrangements)
Meso-institutions
(specific rules delineating
the domain of possible
transactions and their
enforcement)
nce
nt
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tional framework.
 Groenewegen, 2018).
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ery of public utilities. One important issue that remains relatively
underexplored and misunderstood concerns the characterization
of the vertical axis, that is the different incentive mechanisms that
AUTONOMY OF
DECISION// C. Ménard / RAUSP Mana
nstitutions. If we have entered into a new ‘industrial revolution’
and I think we have), there is the imperious necessity to look
t how technological changes go hand in hand with institutional
hanges. However, this co-evolution never works smoothly, cre-
ting gaps and delays that generate distortions, maladaptation,
nd even more profound socio-economic crisis. Second, the rep-
esentation above also suggests that these interactions proceed at
ifferent levels. In that perspective it is essential to disentangle
he concept of institutions. In particular there is a layer that has
ong been ignored by institutionalists (whatever their approach
nd school of thought), which is the institutional intermedi-
te between the level at which general rules and rights and the
odalities of their allocation are defined, and the level of organi-
ational arrangements (markets, firms, hybrids) through which
ransactions are actually implemented. I suggest identifying this
ntermediate layer as meso-institutions.
he  missing  ling:  meso-institutions
Meso-institutions  are the set of devices and mechanisms
hrough which specific rules (embedded in the general ones)
re delineating the domain of transactions that are possible and
llowed and the modalities of their enforcement. ‘Mechanisms’
re here understood as the procedures through which coordi-
ation and monitoring are processed, while ‘devices’ are the
rganizational modalities through which mechanisms operate.
or example, a regulation is a mechanism; a regulatory agency
s a device.
Illustrative of these meso-institutions are the following: (1)
ublic bureaus, for example CALTRANS, the department of
ransportation in charge of organizing and monitoring the road
ystem in California; (2) regulatory agencies, for example
he French ARCEP, the authority in charge of regulating all
lectronic communications and postal services; (3) specialized
ourts, for example the Labor Courts of Israel, specializing in
he implementation of labor law, thus impacting the allocation
f decision rights in employment relationships; (4) arbitraging
rganizations, such as the Arbitration Institute of the Stock-
olm Chamber of Commerce specialized in international dispute
esolution among private partners.
What these diverse institutional devices share is their central
ole in bridging the gap between the general rules of the game
nd the actors operating within these rules. Meso-institutions do
o through three major modalities (Fig. 5).First, meso-institutions translate,  adapt,  and  allocate  rights.
or example, once the European Union has decided to introduce
ompetition in rail transportation and that this has been trans-
Translate
and allocate
Implement
Meso-institutions
Monitor
and
incentivize
Fig. 5. Meso-institutions functions with respect to rules and rights.t Journal 53 (2018) 3–10
ated into national laws (according to the so-called ‘subsidiarity
rinciple’), there is the need to install entities, e.g., a bureau, an
ndependent agency, etc., to allocate rights of access to the rail
etwork, which requires competing companies to meet specific
conomic, financial, and technological norms and standards,
nd to allocate slots to the selected companies. Second, meso-
nstitutions are a central node in the implementation  of theses
pecific rules and rights, for example in their capacity to impose
enalties or even exclude from the market those not respecting
he rules agreed upon. This centrality explains the importance of
he properties of meso-institutions, which has been the source of
n important literature regarding regulatory agencies, for exam-
le about their desirable degree of autonomy, their capacity to
nvestigate, their right to penalize, etc. (Laffont, 2005). Third,
eso-institutions play also a crucial role in monitoring  the actual
unning of the system, for example checking that safety stan-
ards in the delivery of drinkable water are met, and providing
dequate incentives, for example by adopting appropriate rights
f access or tariff systems.
hy  meso-institutions  matter
Most examples above relate to public utilities because this is
n area in which we have learned a lot over the last decades about
he role of meso-institutions, while at the same time important
spects have been neglected, for example regarding the compar-
tive transaction costs of alternative institutional arrangements,
ssues that can fruitfully be explored with the conceptual appara-
us developed by new institutional economists. Let me illustrate
Fig. 6) with a simple model connecting the different status of
ublic utilities (on the diagonal) with elements of the framework
ntroduced above (the axes).
In this figure, the degree of autonomy of property rights with
espect to public authorities is associated to different devices
efining modalities of regulation and combined with the degree
f autonomy of decision-making and the associated incentive
echanisms. This combination helps characterizing the variety
f organizational arrangements that we can observe in the deliv-INCENTIVES
Full residual
claimant
Partial transfer
Joint ventures
Divestiture
Concession
Lease
Management
Public
corporation
Bureau
Regulation through contracts Regulation through
general laws
Command-and-control
Service
to private actors
Bureaucratic
control
over decisions
and incentives AUTONOMY OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS
Fig. 6. The case of public Utilities.
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perate according to different allocation of rights and that could
xplain the observable variety of outcomes (e.g., the success of
ublicly owned and controlled utilities in some institutional con-
ext and their failure in others). These issues are getting high (and
ightly so) on the agenda of international organizations (e.g., the
ECD) and of reputed academic researchers.
hat  future  for  NIE?
Nothing remains ‘new’ forever! The name ‘NIE’ will likely
eave way to other appellations. However, I submit that the
onceptual apparatus introduced by Coase, North, Williamson,
strom and so many others will still pollinate research and
emain relevant for policy-makers for years to come. Let me
onclude by pointing out what I view as some particularly chal-
enging issues that can benefit from the rich contributions of the
ew Institutional Economics research program.
ridging  the  gap
In my view, a central contribution of NIE has been to iden-
ify and characterize the diversity of arrangements that provide
he building blocks of our economies, and to have introduced a
onceptual framework to initiate the analysis of these arrange-
ents. I summarized these concepts under what I identified as
he ‘golden triangle’ of NIE. And I have emphasized that among
he diversity of arrangements, there is a particular need to build
 satisfying theoretical approach to:
(1) The whole set of organizational arrangements, making
oom for hybrids, which have properties that overlap with mar-
ets and firms (‘hierarchies’) on some aspects but radically differ
n some other aspects. As rightly emphasized by Ronald Coase,
hese arrangements might well be the prevalent form of doing
usiness, so that economic theory must engage beyond the sim-
listic dichotomy between markets and firms.
(2) The complex netting of institutional arrangements, here
dentified as ‘meso-institutions’, that bridge the gap between
he general rules and norms defined at the macro-institutional
evel, through the political system, the judiciary, the administra-
ion; and the actual operation of transactions implemented by
ntrepreneurs and actors. Again, this requires economic theory
o go further than the already rich contributions of the founders
f New Institutional Economics and their followers.
evisiting  economic  theory
The main points I wanted to emphasize through the relatively
bstract presentation of these issues is that it is in these inter-
ediate layers (organizational as well as institutional) that a
ot of action is happening; that it is to these intermediate lay-
rs that policy-makers are confronted most of the time (e.g.,
hen regulating unfair trading practices); and that it is in this
irection that economists and social scientists concerned with
nstitutions may expect (or hope) substantial developments. If
t is so, the consequence is that we need an in-depth revision
f some fundamental  components  of  the  existing  economic  the-
ry. Acknowledging the existence and importance of hybrids
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equires revising organization theory, industrial organization,
nd, more substantially, micro-economic theory. Acknowledg-
ng the existence and importance of meso-institutions  requires
uch more attention to a revised version of political economy
taking on board political transaction costs), law and economics,
tc. And accepting that norms and beliefs are part of the fram-
ng of these dimensions requires revisiting the foundations of
ehavioral economics in order to better establish links between
ndividual behavior and collective action.
mpact  for  economic  policies
Although I am neither a policy-maker nor a specialist of pub-
ic policies, I would also like to emphasize that if hybrid modes of
rganization and meso-institutions are significant components
o the field in which substantial  part  of  economic  actions  hap-
en, this is very consequential when it comes to defining and
hoosing economic policies. For example, it likely requires an
n-depth revision of competition laws and guidelines in order
o make room for hybrid arrangements; or it imposes to bet-
er take into account the role of meso-institutions in adapting
eneral rules to specific sectors, specific organizational arrange-
ents, and specific technologies, e.g., allocating property rights
nd decision rights in public-private partnerships operating in a
hanging technological environment.
rapping  it  up
New Institutional Economics does not provide answers to all
hese complex issues nor all tools required to investigate them.
ut it has already delivered substantial means to go further in
ur exploration of these questions. It does so by:
 Providing conceptual  tools, as summarized in the (simplify-
ing) ‘golden triangle’.
 Providing a rich and integrated  framework  of analysis, as
illustrated with the figures summarizing what we have learned
about the diversity of organizational arrangements and the
need to disentangle institutional layers.
 Delivering results  through already substantial empirical con-
tributions that allow raising new questions and indicating paths
for future research.
 Opening a progressive  research  agenda  that can hopefully
attract an increasing number of researchers, particularly young
ones.
Indeed, beside the necessity to continue enriching this theo-
etical framework, there is the need to face a major challenge that
nstitutional as well as organizational theory faces and to which
IE and/or its paradigmatic successor(s) did not, do not escape:
ow to make progress from already very substantial conceptual
evelopments toward measurement, an absolute requirement on
hich we lack behind.onﬂicts  of  interest
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